Accounting researchers frequently employ industry-specific residual based models to draw inferences. Examples include discretionary accruals in Jones (1991) and modified Jones model (1995), and accruals quality in Francis et al. (2005) . This paper illustrates that the interpretation of the residual terms is potentially subject to the problem that arises from industry misclassification. In an industry-specific crosssectional regression, the assumed homogeneity within the same industry is problematic because the industry classification system is noisy, and thus large magnitude residuals are potentially caused by misclassified observations. Moreover, the misclassification may not happen randomly. If firms with certain characteristics are more likely to be misclassified, directional biases rather than pure noise may emerge. In firm-specific time-series settings, the implied stationarity over time for the same firm is also questionable. Firms face external shocks and/or internal changes. The big magnitude residuals could capture those "shock" or "change" years. Given that researchers often investigate whether there exists earnings management around special events, such as M&A or equity issuance, it would be necessary to distinguish between whether abnormal accruals around the event is due to earnings management or simply non-stationarity.
Introduction
Accounting researchers frequently employ industry-specific regressions to control for the cross-sectional heterogeneity across industries (Jones (1991) , Dechow et al. (1995) , Francis et al. (2005) ). The residual terms in these regressions often have special interpretations. For instance, Jones (1991) regresses accruals on change of revenues and PP&E, and interprets the residual term as "discretionary accruals." The rationale is that revenues growth and gross PP&E capture "non-discretionary" accruals. While the original Jones model is applied to firm-specific time-series regressions, researchers have extended the use of this model and its modified version (Dechow et al. (1995) ) to specific industry-year cross-sectional regressions (DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) ; Subramanyam (1996) ).
While the residual based Jones and modified Jones model have become more-or-less generally accepted standards for measuring abnormal accruals, views on these measures or broader residual based category of proxies remain controversial. In their comprehensive review of the earnings quality literature, Dechow et.al (2010) express their concern about the validity of various proxies of earnings quality, including abnormal accruals. Defond (2010) shares this concern by pointing out that "all of our abnormal accruals models suffer from the inherent limitation that we are unable to validate the accuracy of their predictions. For example, we are unable to verify whether our estimates of discretionary accruals are the result of management's opportunistic accounting choices, or just an artifact of the particular model we are using. This is a construct validity problem, which means that we are unsure whether these proxies really measure the underlying theoretical constructs they are intended to measure. .
..One implication is that every test using abnormal accruals proxies is a joint test of the hypothesis related to the research question and the hypothesis that the proxy is a valid measure."
A related and more prominent excerpt comes from Ball (1994) 's comments on testing Efficient Market Hypothesis (hereafter EMH). Ball (1994) 
states that: "These limitations (in the theory of asset pricing) must be borne in mind when choosing whether to interpret the data as evidence of :(1) market (in)efficiency, under the maintained hypothesis that a specific model of asset pricing used to benchmark price behavior, correctly describes pricing; or (2) the ability of our models to encapsulate how prices behave, under the maintained hypothesis of efficiency."
To summarize, it is well understood that any hypothesis test based on a model is a joint test of the hypothesis and the correctness of the model. Two types of error could be introduced by an imperfect model. The type 1 error incorrectly rejects the null when indeed the null is true, while the type 2 error incorrectly fails to reject the null when the alternative hypothesis is true. The type 2 error usually arises from an insufficient power due to the noisy measurement. For instance, Hribar and Collins (2002) document an example of type 2 error where the researchers using a balance sheet approach to measure accruals (as opposed to measuring accruals directly from the statement of cash flows) will introduce measurement errors. As a result, tests of market mispricing of accruals may have failed to reject the null due to misclassification of firms into extreme accruals portfolios. In contrast to the type 2 error, the type 1 error cannot be induced by noise per se. Actually pure noise would only reduce the power and hence works against rejecting the null. The only possibility that the type 1 error occurs is when the "bias", rather than pure noise, is introduced. In this paper, we will use Francis et. al. (2005) as an example to show the potential occurrence of the type 1 error that arises from the industry-specific residual based models. Francis et al. (2005) is one of the many papers that investigate whether the market prices earnings quality. Building on the concepts of accruals quality (as a measure of earnings quality) first developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and refined by McNichols (2002) , Francis et al. (2005) investigate the relation between accruals quality and the costs of debt and equity capital. They find that the market prices accruals quality. They use the concept of information risk to explain this pricing effect. The information risk here is pertinent to investor pricing decisions in using accounting earnings, as low accruals quality does a poor job in mapping earnings into cash flows, which is ultimately relevant in valuation. Hence, lower accruals quality increases non-diversifiable information risk. Francis et al. (2005) proxy accruals quality (hereafter AQ) as the standard deviation of five-year fitted residuals from an industry-year specific regression that regresses total current accruals on past, present and future operating cash flows. They argue that the residual term captures the within-industry cross-sectional variation in accruals unmatched by cash flows. The critical assumption of this category of industry models is the relative homogeneity across the firms within the industry. This paper challenges this assumption and show that the widely-used SIC industry classification is noisy and leads to substantial misclassification. Those misclassified observations, by definition, are more likely to yield large residuals. Therefore, the large-residual observations could be the result of misclassification rather than poorer AQ. Hence, the measure of AQ in Francis et al. (2005) is subject to measurement error. This measurement error due to industry misclassification is not necessarily a problem if firms are misclassified in a random manner. Theoretically, pure noise reduces the power of the test, and hence works against finding any significant results. Going back to Francis et al. (2005) , their results are even strengthened rather than challenged if misclassification purely induces noise. However, if certain characteristic firms are more likely to be misclassified, the measurement error is no longer pure noise. Under this scenario, even if Francis et al. (2005) find that AQ is positively associated with cost of capital, both high AQ and cost of capital could be driven by certain firm characteristics. Hence their inferences that AQ is priced by the market could be incorrect, as the positive relation between AQ measure and cost of capital might not imply causality.
I provide preliminary evidence to show that industry misclassification is not likely to be a random event. Firms with certain characteristics are more likely to be misclassified. Misclassification in this paper is defined empirically as a rank measure of the distance between a particular firm to a "typical" firm that presumably represents this industry well.For instance, consider the beer industry, a typical firm may produce a national brand and choose a large production quantity as its efficient plant size. On the other hand, some micro-brewers may cater to the demand for some special characteristics of beer,such as special flavor or low (high) price, and choose a much smaller production quantity as its efficient size. Hence, the existence of plants of different sizes within the same beer industry is indicative of product differentiation and the firms' optimal size choices in equilibrium based on different cost structure.
In our beer example, if a national brand producer is more representative of the industry, small firms are misclassified in the sense that they provide different product attributes and have different cost curve, etc. It is also more difficult to correctly classify a smaller firm due to more severe information asymmetry problem. Smaller firms tend to have fewer analysts following and their disclosure is less transparent (Botosan (1997) ). Moreover, holding firm size constant, multi-segment firms are mechanically misclassified simply because no single business category fits them best. If size or number of segments or any other firm characteristics are determinants of misclassification, the industry misclassification is no longer pure noise. Rather, misclassification introduces directional bias into the model, which could influence the interpretation of the results. In other words, alternative explanations need to be considered.
I show that the SIC-based industry classification scheme is noisy. I also construct a rank measure of misclassification and show that this measure is negatively associated with firm size. Moreover, controlling for size, this measure is positively associated with the number of business segments. Using Francis et al. (2005) as an example, I argue that their worse AQ (i.e., bigger residual) firms tend to have larger misclassification ranks. This provides a potential alternative interpretation of the results in Francis et al.(2005) . For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1989) document "illiquidity discount" (see also Damodaran (2005) ), and Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) document "diversification discount". Both explanations are potentially consistent with the findings in Francis et al. (2005) and the misinterpretation explanation presented in this paper. This paper contributes to the literature by documenting the potential misinterpretation of the industry based residual models that arises from industry misclassification. The implication is that researchers should consider alternative explanations for their findings.
It is worth noting that the objective of this paper is not to provide a strong rebuttal to Francis et. al (2005) . As a matter of fact, despite that we provide reasonable evidence to show that at least partial of the results in their paper is driven by the misinterpretation of the model, we cannot completely refute their story. The paper's goal is to issue a note of caution of the potential type 1 error due to the "bias" that arises from non-random industry misclassification. And the validity of this caution is not critically dependent on the complete rule out of the conclusion reached by Francis et al. (2005) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that the SICbased industry classification is noisy. In Section 3, I construct a rank measure of industry misclassification and demonstrate that this measure is negatively associated with firm size, and controlling for size, positively associated with number of business segments. This basically infers that the industry misclassification is not only noisy but also biased. Starting from section 4 and continue through section 5, I use Francis et al. (2005) as an example to show that their documented cost of capital effects associated with AQ are potentially vulnerable to alternative explanations based on misclassification induced model bias. Section 6 concludes.
Noisy Industry Classification
In this section, I will provide evidence to show that the SIC based industry classification is indeed noisy. Recall that the noisy industry classification is one of the premises of my paper.
Different Industry Classification Systems
There are four readily available industry classification systems: SIC (Standardized Industry Classification), NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), GIC (Global Indus-try Classification) and FF . The availability of SIC codes dates back to 1939, when an Interdepartmental Committee on Industrial Classification operating under the jurisdiction of the Central Statistical Board established the system. SIC codes were set up to promote the general adoption of the standard industry classification of the Federal Government. Since its inception, SIC has indeed become the primary criterion for delineating industrial activities in the US. It is not only used by government agencies, but also by financial practitioners and financial economists. Despite the wide use of SIC codes, researchers argue that SIC system has serious problems and limitations. Clarke (1989) investigates the intra-industry (industry as identified by SIC) homogeneity and finds that SIC does a poor job of grouping firms with similar sales growth, profit margins and stock return. Clarke (1989) provides a classic example of the possible source of error associated with SIC. Consider a firm with three products: 40% revenue in SIC 3211, and 30% each in SIC 2842 and 2845. In general, a database vendor would assign the four-digit SIC code that corresponds to the product group with the greatest value of product shipments. Thus, in this example, the vendor will assign 3211 to the firm, leading to a three-digit SIC 321 and two-digit SIC 32, while 60% of the revenue comes from 284 three-digit and 28 two-digit SIC. This example shows that SIC classification can result in a very misleading two-or three-digit SIC code, unfortunately, most capital market research rely on two-or three-digit SIC codes.
Moreover, there exists significant disagreement in SIC codes across different databases for the same firm-years. Guenther and Rosman (1994) document substantial SIC difference between Compustat and CRSP, with 38% classification disagreement at the two-digit level. Kahle and Walkling (1996) further point out that the two major data vendors disagree on 80% of classifications at the four-digit level. The large magnitude of the disagreement between two professional vendors seems to suggest that classifying firms into industry is a difficult job. Different judgments can induce significantly different results even guided by the same framework.
In order to improve SIC code, the major statistical agencies of Canada, Mexico and the United States introduced NAICS in 1999. The new scheme changes industry classification by using productionas the basis for grouping firms, creating 358 new industries, and extensively rearranging SIC categories. Krishnan and Press (2003) investigate the implications of the NAICS for accounting research. They show that NAICS outperforms SIC system in defining more homogeneous manufacturing, transportation and service industries.It is worth noting that SIC and NAICS share many characteristics: both are designed by government agencies, with little consideration for the finance community in mind, and both use similar grouping guidelines. For instance, the SIC classification also partly depends on the production process in addition to the output. Not surprisingly, Bhojraj et al. (2003) find that SIC and NAICS perform fairly similarly in most financial applications.
The Fama-French 48-industry system is the only classification scheme designed by finance academia. In their study of industry cost-of-capital, Fama and French (1997) regroup SIC codes into 48 industries. They claim that their industry classification is more likely to pick common risk characteristics. However, it is evident that most of the noise in the SIC system would be present in Fama-French classification, as well. Thus the SIC and Fama-French systems are highly interdependent.
The GIC system is co-developed by Standard and Poor's (S&P) and Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). It "aims to enhance the investment research and asset management process for financial professionals worldwide," according to the GIC Guide Book. Hence, this system is clearly designed for the finance community and it uses business activity as opposed to supply-side production and technology as the major basis for defining industries. Specifically, a company's sources of revenue and earnings play major roles. This approach leads to a major departure from SIC, NAICS and FF, which rely heavily on supply-based identification.
While the GIC codes have gained popularity among financial practitioners, its use in academic research is limited. Bhojraj et al. (2003) promote the academic use of GIC codes by arguing that the GIC classification system is significantly better at explaining stock return co-movements, cross-sectional variations in valuation multiples, forecasted and realized growth rates, R&D expenditures, and various key financial ratios. Moreover, these GIC advantages are consistent from year-to-year while the other three methods differ little from each other in most applications.
Overall, SIC, NAICS and FF have more commonalities than differences. GIC seems to provide a more independent and more appropriate way of classifying firms from finance community's perspective.
Testing the Effectiveness of SIC Codes
Since most academic researchers use either the SIC or SIC-based Fama-French 48-industry classification scheme, it is crucial to assess how well the hierarchical SIC classifies firms into distinct industries. The maintained hypothesis is that firms within the same industry should exhibit similar characteristics or movements in stock price and key accounting variables. Parrino (1997) argues that the exogenous factors that affect one firm in a particular industry will also affect other firms in the same industry. Because the firms within the same industry employ similar production technologies and/or compete in similar markets, news concerning technology shocks or market demand should affect these firms' cash flows and stock returns in a similar manner. Moreover, the external shocks would also be reflected in key accounting variables (Guenther and Rosman (1994) ). I thus choose the six variables as the basis for judging the effectiveness of SIC codes in this section, and also the basis for constructing a measure of misclassification in the next section. These six variables are average monthly stock return, assets turnover, sales growth rate, ROA, leverage and price-to-book. Five accounting ratios are chosen to assess growth, profitability, turnover efficiency, risk and valuation. If SIC is effective in grouping homogeneous firms, subdividing firms into SICs with more digits from SICs with fewer digits should help explain the variation in these six variables. I use a dummy variable (Judge (1980) ) model to test this hypothesis. In particular, I conduct F-tests to compare restricted and unrestricted residual sums of squares to determine whether going from n-digit SIC groups to (n-1)-digit SIC level significantly increases the sum of squared model errors.
The dummy model (Judge (1980) ) may oversimplify reality since it has most likely omitted variable problems. However, this is less a problem here since the focus is to assess the relative explanatory power between n-digit SIC and (n-1)-digit SIC classification. As long as industry identity is a significant predictor, the F-test based on ratio of residual sums of squares should be able to detect the effectiveness of the SIC scheme.
The sample covers from 1991 to 2004, which includes at least one full business cycle yet is relatively short so that the firm's industry identity remains fairly consistent. To be included in the sample, the firm must have non-missing values for all six variables and SIC code. Moreover, negative book-value firms are excluded. The final sample size is 35,792 firm-years. Panel A of Table 1 shows the summary statistics for those six variables. Panel B of Table 1 reports the F-statistic and related significance in testing the effectiveness of SIC code in classifying firms into industries. A statistically significant F-statistic indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no decline in the model's explanatory power when we go from n-digit SIC to (n-1)-digit SIC. The result of interest is that no significant explanatory loss occurs in going from 4-digit to 3-digit, 3-digit to 2-digit and 2-digit to 1-digit (though price-to-book is marginally significant from 2-digit to 1-digit).
There does exist a significant loss of explanatory power (i.e., all the F-statistics are at least significant at 1% level) when going from 1-digit to 0-digit. Table 1 suggests that SIC is most effective in separating firms into very broad sectors. (i.e., 1-digit level) As SIC goes beyond broad sectors and tries to do more refined classification, it does a poor job in grouping firms into homogeneous industries. Since academic researchers most frequently use either 2-digit or 3-digit SIC, current industry classification tends to be imprecise.
Constructing a Measure of Industry Misclassification
In this section, I will first construct a measure of industry misclassification. Then I will show that this measure is correlated to certain firm characteristics, which supports the second premise of our theory, i.e., industry misclassification is not random.
A Rank Measure of the Industry Misclassification
Based on the maintained hypothesis that firms within the same industry should exhibit similar stock returns and accounting metrics, I propose a rank measure of industry misclassification, using the following procedure. For each industry-year with at least 20 observations, I identify the median values of six variables (i.e., average monthly stock return, assets turnover, sales growth rate, ROA, leverage, price-to-book). Then for each firm within the industry-year, I calculate the absolute value of the difference between this firm's value and the corresponding median value, for each of the six variables. For each variable, I rank order the firms into 10 deciles in the ascending order of their absolute value of this difference. Then, for each firm, I calculate the weighted average of six constructed rank deciles (average monthly stock return carries half weight, the other five variables each carries 0.1 weight),Finally, I rank order those weighted average numbers within each industryyear to give the deciles for the firm-years. The higher the final decile rank, the more likely this firm-year is misclassified.
The assumptions behind this rank measure construction are (a) a hypothetical allmedian-valued firm is representative of a typical, correctly classified firm for this particular industry-year; and (b) a larger deviation of a firm from this median-valued firm implies that this firm is more likely to be misclassified. However, in reality, this all-median-valued firm may not exist because those six variables are likely to be correlated. As a robustness check, instead of using this artificially constructed firm as the comparison base, I try to identify a representative actual firm by doing a cluster analysis and letting an algorithm choose the most representative "seed" firm. Then, I follow the exactly same approach to construct the rank measure. The two methods yield quite highly correlated rank measures and similar results.
Panel A of Table 2 displays the transition matrix of the rank measure of misclassification for the period 1991-2004. Each cell that corresponds to row iand column j contains four pieces of information: the first figure is the number of firmyears that were in misclassification decile iin period (t − 1) and transferred to misclassification decile j in period t. The other three numbers are row percent, column percent and total percent, which represents the percentage of period (t − 1) decile ifirm-years that transferred to decile j in period t, the percentage of period t decile j firm-years that were transferred from decile iin period (t − 1) and the percentage of total firm-years that transferred from period (t − 1) decile ito decile j in period t, respectively. The main observation from Panel A of Table 2 is that the misclassification rank measure is the most stable in the extreme deciles. For instance, 28% of period-(t−1) decile 10 (i.e., mostly likely to be misclassified) firm-years stay in decile 10 at period-t, another 16% of period-(t − 1) decile 10 firm-years become decile 9 at period-t. On the other hand, only 5% of period-(t − 1) decile 10 firm-years become decile 1 or decile 2 at period-t. Similar data pattern exists for period-(t − 1) decile 1 firm-years. In contrast to the extreme deciles, the middle deciles show much less stability. For example, period-(t − 1) decile 7 has a flat transition percentage to period-t deciles. It ranges from 8.1% (from period-(t − 1) decile 7 to period-t deciles 1 or 10) to 11.8% (from period-(t − 1) decile 7 to period-t decile 7). Similar patterns can be observed for period-(t − 1) decile 5 and 6.
Industry Misclassification Is Not Random
In this subsection, I will present some evidence to support the argument that industry misclassification is not random. Therefore, a bias rather than a pure noise could be induced in industry-specific residual based models.
Intuitively, industry misclassification is not necessarily random. Firms with certain characteristics may be more likely to be misclassified. A firm is misclassified when it is significantly different from a "typical" firm that represents the industry well. To understand the determinants of misclassification, a basic review of industry organization theory is necessary. First of all, even in a very refined categories of industry (for instance, 4-digit SIC), monopoly is rarely seen. Typically, we see multiple different size firms providing similar products within the industry. Those products provided by different firms, even under the same commodity name, are often substitutes, yet never perfect substitutes. Lancaster (1966 Lancaster ( , 1971 Lancaster ( , 1979 views each commodity as a bundle of attributes. The products within the same industry are located in different places in an attribute space. The closer are the two products in the attribute space, the closer substitutes they are. Second, firms choose their optimal plant size based on their cost function. Stigler (1968) made use of the following simple but powerful observation: in a homogeneous-good industry (i.e., each firm in the industry produces the exact same product and faces the exact same cost curve), if a particular plant size is efficient (presumably the production scale that corresponds to the minimum average cost), eventually all plants in the industry should approach that size. Any plant or firm size that survives for a long time has to be efficient. On the other hand, if firms face different costs or produce different products, their optimal scales will vary. To summarize, Stigler's optimal scale theory suggests that the heterogeneity of firm sizes within the so-called same industry indicates the existence of product differentiation and casts doubt on the homogeneity assumption implied by industry models. Stigler's theory also implies size as a potential predictor of industry misclassification. In another context and consistent with Stigler's theory, Albuquerque (2009) finds that the lack of empirical evidence in support of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) is due to the use of inappropriate peer firms, which only use the industry as benchmark. Using peer firms in the same industry-size group, Albuquerque (2009) finds strong evidence supporting the use of RPE in CEO compensation.
Smaller firms also have more serious information asymmetry problem: fewer analysts following, less quantity and worse quality disclosure (Botosan (1997) ). Information asymmetry is potentially a contributing factor since vendors assign SIC codes.
Moreover, a firm with multiple business segments is mechanically misclassified simply because no single business category fits them best. Panel B of Table 2 reports the mean and median values for assets, sales and number of segments across ten misclassification deciles. It is clear that average size, especially measured by sales, monotonically decreases as the misclassification likelihood increases (higher decile means higher likelihood of misclassification). The univariate relationship between the number of segments and misclassification deciles is, however, monotonically decreasing, contrary to our prediction. Since size and number of segments are highly correlated, univariate relation between misclassification and number of segments could be misleading. In Panel C, I regress firm-year's misclassification decile on firm size (measured by log sales) and firm's number of business segments. The coefficient of number of segments becomes significantly positive, and the coefficient of size remains significantly negative.
To summarize, Table 2 suggests that smaller firms are more likely to be misclassified, and multi-segment firms are also more likely to be misclassified after controlling for size. Therefore, misclassification is not a random event and may introduce directional bias rather than pure noise into the residual centered analysis based on industry models.
While the preliminary evidence above suggests that size and the number of segments could be determinants of misclassification, we are not excluding any other factors as potential candidates. The determinants may also vary across industries. Future research needs to be done to better answer this question.
Francis et al. (2005)
Since we will use Francis et al. (2005) as an example to show the potential misinterpretation problem of residual based models that arises from industry misclassification, an introduction to this paper follows below. Francis et al. (2005) investigate whether investors price accruals quality, as defined by Dechow and Dichev (2002) . The justification is that a weak mapping between accruals and cash flow implies poor accruals quality because it imposes an information risk to investors in using earnings as valuation input. Francis et.al. (2005) argue that this information risk is non-diversifiable and hence should be priced. Accordingly, they find that poorer AQ is associated with larger debt and equity costs. In the second half of the paper, they also try to distinguish between innate AQ (those driven by economic fundamentals) and discretionary AQ (those driven by management choices). They find that both components have significant cost of capital effects, with innate AQ effects significantly larger than discretionary AQ effects.
A Brief Introduction
I perform multiple tests to check the first part of the results in Francis et al. (2005) . The focus is to investigate whether their results are driven by industry misclassification or by accruals quality. The second part of their paper (i.e., innate versus discretionary AQ) is left out for the following two reasons. First, if their first part result is sensitive to the misspecification problem, their second part is not immune either because innate and discretionary AQ are decomposed from the total AQ. Second, in terms of methodology, Francis et al. (2005) derive their innate and discretionary AQ via annual regression rather than industry regressions, hence is less relevant. Francis et al. (2005) argue that poor accruals quality implies high information risk. Hence, accruals quality should be priced by the market. In particular, they argue that firms with poor accruals quality have higher costs of capital. Francis et al. (2005) construct their AQ metric by first running the following industry-year specific cross-sectional regression for each of Fama and French's (1997) 48 industries with at least 20 firms in year t.
Hypotheses, Methodologies and Major findings
TCA j,t = β 0,j +β 1,j CFO j,t−1 +β 2,j CFO j,t +β 3,j CFO j,t+1 +β 4,j ∆Rev j,t +β 5,j PPE j,t +ϵ j,t
where TCAj,t= ∆CAj,t− ∆CLj,t− ∆Cashj,t+ ∆STDEBTj,t=total current accruals in year t, CFOj,t= NIBEj,t−TAj,t=firm j's cash flow from operations in year t, NIBEj,t=firm j's net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t, T Aj,t= (∆CAj,t−∆CLj,t−∆Cashj,t+ ∆STDEBTj,t− DEPNj,t) =firm j's total accruals in year t, ∆CAj,t=firm j's change in current assets (Compustat #4) between year t-1 and t, ∆CLj,t=firm j's change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1 and t, ∆Cashj,t=firm j's change in cash (Compustat #1) between year t-1 and t, ∆STDEBTj,t=firm j's change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat #34) between year t-1 and t, DEPNj,t=firm j's depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t, ∆Revj,t=firm j's change in revenues (Compustat #12) between year t-1 and t, P P Ej,t=firm j's gross value of PPE (Compustat #7) in year t.
Estimation of (1) produces industry-year specific coefficients that in turn yield the fitted firm-year specific residuals ϵj,t. AQj,tis defined as the standard deviation of firm j's residuals, σ(ϵj,t), where σ is calculated from years t − 4 through t. have data on the cost of debt (using interest expense as a percent of interestingbearing debt, CostDebt, as a proxy) and 55,092 have cost of equity (using industryadjusted earnings-price ratio, IndEP, as a proxy). They run the following FamaMacBeth regression using the decile ranks of AQ for the period t=1970-2001, where regressions (2) and (3) test the cost of debt effect and cost of equity effect, respectively.
CostDebtj,t=θ0+θ1Leveragej,t+θ2Sizej,t+θ3ROAj,t+θ4IntCovj,t +θ5σ(N IBE)j,t+θ6AQj,t+ςj,t(2)
where Leveragej,t= firm j's ratio of interest-bearing debt to total assets in year t, Sizej,t= log of firm j's total assets in year t, ROAj,t= firm j's return on assets in year t, IntCovj,t= firm j's ratio of operating income to interest expense in year t, σ(N IBE)j,t= standard deviation of firm j's net income before extraordinary items N IBE, scaled by average assets, over the rolling prior 10-year period. At least five observations of N IBE are required to calculate the standard deviation. , t= ϑ0 + ϑ1Growthj, t+ ϑ2Leveragej, t+ ϑ3Betaj, t+ ϑ4Sizej, t+ ϑ5AQj, t+ ςj, t(3) where Growth is the log of one plus the firm's growth in book value of equity overthe past 5 years, Beta is the 5-year rolling pre-estimated beta obtained from firm-specific CAPM estimations using the past 5 years of data. At least 18 monthly returns are required. Francis et al. (2005) report the time series mean of estimated coefficients and related t-statistic for regressions (2) and (3) in Panel B and Panel C of their Table  2 . The mean estimated coefficient has 0.14 (t-value 13.36) for AQ in regression (2) and 0.0013 (t-value 5.83) for AQ in regression (3). This suggests a difference of 126 bp (0.14 multiplied by nine decile differences) in realized costs of debt between the worst and the best AQ deciles. Francis et al. (2005) reject their H1 in null and support the alternative hypothesis that firms with poor accruals quality have higher costs of capital than firms with good accruals quality. However, the test of H1 is a joint test of the hypothesis and the effectiveness of their industry AQ model as specified by equation (1). Similar to the case in testing EMH, the rejection of the null of no cost-of-capital effect associated with AQ could be due to the bias of the model even if the null hypothesis is correct. In this section, I perform serial tests to check the robustness of Francis et al. (2005) .
IndEPj

Multiple Robustness Tests of Francis et al. (2005)
My results suggest that by controlling for the possible model bias, the documented cost of capital effect associated with AQ in Francis et al. (2005) becomes much less significant. I provide alternative explanations for the results reported in Francis et al. (2005) . These explanations are consistent with the "bias" story that is based on industry misclassification.
First, to ensure consistency, I use the same 1970-2001 data period as in Francis et al. (2005) . Constructions of all relevant variables follow their paper. In total, I have 87,744 firm-year observations with data on AQ. Un-tabulated results show that the statistics match fairly well with the corresponding table (Table 1) in Francis et al. (2005) .
In the remaining analysis of this section, I use 1991-2004 as the time frame of analysis to include a full business cycle. First, I show that the rank measure of misclassification, AQ, and the magnitude of residuals from industry AQ model equation (1) are positively correlated. The prediction is that misclassification leads to larger residuals, and large residuals are positively correlated with larger AQ (i.e., larger standard deviation of residuals). Hence, all three measures should be positively correlated. Table 3 reports the summary statistics and correlation among the above three variables for the 27,149 firm-years in 1991-2004. The correlation between magnitude of residuals and AQ (i.e., standard deviation of residuals) is 0.91, while the correlation between these two residual-based variables and misclassification deciles are 0.22 and 0.23 respectively, and both are statistically significant. The sample consists of 27,149 firm-years that have valid values for all the three variables. AQ follows definition in Francis et al. (2005) , is the standard deviation of 5-year residuals from regression (1). Residual magnitude is the average absolute value of the same 5-year residuals from regression (1). Misclassification decile follows the definition in section 3.1. Means of annual regressions of cost of debt on accruals quality, with controls
CostDebt j ,t = è 0 + è 1 Leverage j ,t + è 2 Size j ,t + è 3 ROA j ,t + è 4 IntCov j ,t + è 5 ó (NIBE) j ,t +è 6 AQ j ,t + è 7 AQ j ,t * Interaction + ò j ,t Variable definition: Decile: measures how far a particular firm-year is from its industry-median. The higher decile is, the further the firm is from industry median. It's constructed as follows: for each industry-year with at least 20 observations, the median value of six variables (i.e., monthly average stock return, assets turnover, sales growth rate, roa, leverage, price-to-book) are identified first, then for each firm within the industryyear, I calculate the absolute value of the difference between this firm's six-variable values and their corresponding median respectively. For each variable, I rank order the firms into 10 deciles in the ascending order of their absolute value of the difference, then a weighted average (monthly average stock return carries half weight, the other five variables carries 0.1 weight each) of the six variable rank order deciles is rank ordered again to give the Decile for this particular firm.
Dummy5
: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if Decile=10 or 9, 0 otherwise. Dummy4: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if Decile=8 or 7, 0 otherwise Dummy3: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if Decile=6 or 5, 0 otherwise. Dummy2: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if Decile=4 or 3, 0 otherwise. Dummy1: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if Decile=2 or 1, 0 otherwise. Analyst: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if this particular firm-year is correctly classified according to 5-analysts rule. In this table, 3,728 observations take value one for this indicator.
Panel B: Costs of equity test
The sample used in the earnings-price ratio tests contains 22,387 firm-year observations over 1991-2004. Beta is the 5-year rolling pre-estimated Beta obtained from firm-specific CAPM estimations.
Dummy5
: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if Decile=10 or 9, 0 otherwise. Dummy4: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if Decile=8 or 7, 0 otherwise. Dummy3: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if Decile=6 or 5, 0 otherwise. Dummy2: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if Decile=4 or 3, 0 otherwise. Dummy1: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if Decile=2 or 1, 0 otherwise. Analyst: is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if this particular firm-year is correctly classified according to 5-analysts rule. In this table, 2,953 observations take value one for this indicator.
Means of annual regressions of industry-adjusted EP ratio on accruals quality, with controls IndEP j ,t = ϑ 0 + ϑ 1 Growth j ,t + ϑ 2 Leverage j ,t + ϑ 3 Beta j ,t + ϑ 4 Size j ,t + ϑ 5 AQ j ,t + ϑ 6 AQ j ,t * Interaction + ò j ,t Pred Sign Table 4 reports the results of first set of tests. This set of tests augments regression (2) and (3) with additional independent variables. In both Panel A (cost of debt) and Panel B (cost of equity), model 1 is the original regression in Francis et al. (2005) . Similar to their findings, I find a significant positive coefficient for AQ decile for model 1 in both panels. Model 2 modifies regressions (2) and (3) by adding an interaction term between annual AQ decile and misclassification decile. The motivation is to investigate whether the significance of the original coefficient of AQ (θ6 model1 and ϑ5 model1 ) is primarily due to misclassification (Decile). Note that in panel A, θ6 model1 = θ6 model2 + θ7*Decile (a similar relation exists for Panel B). If the cost of capital effect associated with AQ is mainly driven by misclassification rather than accruals quality, I would expect θ6 model2 in Panel A and ϑ5 model2 in Panel B to become insignificant and θ7 in Panel A and ϑ6 in Panel B to be significant and positive. The Panel A (Panel B) shows that θ6 model2 (ϑ5 model2 ) is 0.036 (0.0002) and statistically insignificant and θ7 (ϑ6) is 0.021 (0.0002) and statistically significant. This result suggests that the significance of θ6 model1 and ϑ5 model1 is largely explained by the misclassification deciles.
The remaining models in Table 4 incorporate an interaction term between AQ and a dummy of misclassification quintile 1-5, respectively (in models 3-7), and a dummy of correct classification (in model 8) into the original regression (2) and (3). Assuming quintile 1 (5) represents the least (most) likely misclassified observations, I predict negative (positive) coefficient for the interaction term in model 3(7). The predictions are supported by the results. As for the middle quintiles 2,3,and 4, the coefficients of interaction terms are in general not significant, consistent with the observation that our misclassification measures are more effective for the extreme quintiles and much less so for the middle quintiles.
Model 8 in Table 4 identifies a group of "correctly classified" observations and then inter-acts this dummy flag with AQ deciles. The creation of this "correctly classified" dummy is based on the five-analyst rule (Ramnath (2002) ). For each industry-year, I identify a group of "correctly classified" firms such that each firm has at least five analysts in common with every other firm in the group. The drawback of this approach is that it is applicable only to firms with five or more analysts in IBES database. A lot of potentially "correctly classified" firms are left out. The advantage is that we have confidence in these 'correctly classified" observations. If we interact this 'correctly classified" dummy with AQ decile, the "misclassification" story would predict a negative coefficient for θ7 in Panel A and negative ϑ6 in Panel B.
Overall, the results reported in Table 4 support the hypothesis that the AQ measurement proposed by Francis et al. (2005) has significant errors. Those errors are likely due to industry misclassification and may induce the positive association between AQ measure and cost of capital. In particular, θ7 (ϑ6) in models 3, 7 and 8 are -0.12(-0.0007), 0.20(0.0018), and -0.12(-0.0008) respectively. All of these estimates are statistically significant and have the right signs as predicted by "misclassification story."
The second set of tests is based on sample partitioning. Before I explain the logic of the tests and go to the results in Table 6 , let me introduce Table 5 as a prerequisite. Parrino (1997) creates an industry homogeneity proxy based on the correlation between stock returns within 2-digit SIC industries. I use the same approach, but use Fama-French 48-industry rather than SIC. First, a correlation measure is calculated as follows: an equally weighted return index is estimated for each Fama-French industry using the firms for which monthly returns are reported on the CRSP database between January 1991 and December 2004. The monthly return for each firm in each index is then regressed against an equally weighted market return index and the industry return index The mean partial correlation proxy is computed by averaging, across all firms in each Fama-French 48 industry, the partial correlation coefficient for an industry return index in a two-factor market model that also includes a market return index. The industries are listed in order of decreasing homogeneity. Finally, the partial correlation coefficient for the industry return index in this regression is averaged across all firms in each industry to obtain a proxy for the similarity of firms within each industry, referred to as the mean partial correlation proxy. A higher mean partial correlation indicates a more homogenous industry. Table 5 reports the mean partial correlation proxy in order of decreasing homogeneity for Fama-French industries.
Next, I turn to the tests in Table 6 . The first partition (Table 6 , Panel A) relies on adjusted R-squared from regression (1). The logic is as follows. A higher R-squared from regression (1) implies more explanatory power of industry AQ model (1), and hence suggests a better industry classification and less degree of misclassification. If my hypothesis (i.e., misclassification induces cost of capital effect) is correct, the lower R-squared (i.e., more serious misclassification) industries should exhibit stronger cost of capital effect associated with the so-called AQ. On the other hand, if Francis et al. (2005) is right, the lower R-squared industries are more noisy, and hence will have weaker cost of capital effect associated with AQ. This provides a test, which may differentiate the two alternative hypotheses. One assumes the industry classification is homogeneous and worse AQ leads to higher cost of capital, the other hypothesis assumes the industry classification is noisy and the misclassified firms have certain characteristics which contribute to the documented cost-of-capital effect. The second partition (Table 6 , Panel B) follows the exactly same logic, but uses the direct proxy of industry homogeneity as Parrino (1997) to divide industries.
Panel A of Table 6 shows that higher R-squared industries exhibit smaller cost-ofcapital effect associated with AQ. For partition 1, the sensitivity of cost of debt (cost of equity) to AQ is 0.12 (0.0008) for those with greater than median adjusted Rsquared versus 0.15 (0.0010) for those with less than median adjusted R-squared. For partition 2, the sensitivity of cost of debt (cost of equity) to AQ is 0.11 (0.0007) for quintiles 4 and 5 versus 0.16 (0.0012) for quintiles 1 and 2. Similar though stronger results are reported in Panel B of Table 6 . For partition 1, the sensitivity of cost of debt (cost of equity) to AQ is 0.06 (0.0004) for those with greater than median partial correlation versus 0.21 (0.0015) for those with less than median partial correlation. For partition 2, the sensitivity of cost of debt (cost of equity) to AQ is 0.05 (0.0004) for quintile 4 and 5 versus 0.22 (0.0017) for quintiles 1 and 2.
The results in Table 6 support the "misclassification" story and cast doubt on the AQ-based explanation provided by Francis et al. (2005) .
In order for the misclassification argument of the industry model to be convincing, I need to explain why the inclusion of misclassified firms would necessarily lead to a higher cost of capital. In other words, if misclassification is a pure "noise", it would not impose any challenge to Francis et al. (2005) since noise would reduce the power of finding any significant result. However, as argued earlier, industry misclassification is unlikely to be random, firms with certain characteristics are more likely to be misclassified. In particular, misclassification tends to be associated with smaller firms. Controlling for size, multi-segment firms are also likely to be misclassified. This introduces directional bias into the industry AQ model and provides an alternative explanation for the documented cost-of-capital effect. In particular, I propose to use "illiquidity discount" and "diversification discount" as alternative explanations. Berger and Ofek (1995) find that U.S. conglomerates are priced at a mean discount of about 15 percent. Lins and Servaes (1999) document similar discounts in Japan and the United Kingdom. Lang and Stulz (1994) find that multi-segment firms have lower values of Tobin's q compared to stand-alone firms. This so-called "diversification discount" may be explained by the following reasons: corporate focus (Comment and Jarrell, (1995) ), internal inefficient capital flow (Rajan et al., (2000) ), and agency cost (Denis et al. (1997) ). Moreover, smaller firms have less liquid assets and equity, hence a higher discount rate would be required to compensate for illiquidity. This "illiquidity discount" (Amihud and Mendelson (1989) , Damodaran (2005) ) along with the "diversification discount" provide a reinterpretation of the cost-of-capital effect associated with AQ documented in Francis et. al.(2005) . That is, the seemingly significant cost-of-capital effect associated with AQ is largely induced by misclassified firms. Table 7 directly tests this alternative hypothesis by adding the number of business segments, and the measure of illiquidity, as two additional independent variables to regressions (2) and (3). I use turnover ratio, defined as the ratio of trading volume to the number of outstanding shares, as a proxy for liquidity. In the cost-of-debt test, "illiquidity discount" is significant (t-value=-6.57) while "diversification discount" is at most marginally significant (t-value=1.93), the AQ coefficient becomes much less significant and t-value barely exceeds 1.96. In the cost-of-equity test, both "illiquidity discount" and "diversification discount" are significant (with a t-value -9.74 and 4.57, respectively), and the AQ coefficient becomes in-significant. The results lend support to the conjecture that the documented cost-of-capital effect associated with AQ is likely due to the industry misclassification. Table 6 : The association between accruals quality and proxies for the costs of debt and equity capital, 1991-2004 (cont'd) Panel B: partitioned on homogeneity proxy of industries in Table 5 ( Parrino , 1997) Means of annual regressions of cost of debt on accruals quality, with controls CostDebt j ,t = è 0 + è 1 Leverage j ,t + è 2 Size j ,t + è 3 ROA j ,t + è 4 IntCov j ,t + è 5 ó (NIBE) j ,t + è 6 AQ j ,t + ò j ,t Means of annual regressions of cost of equity on accruals quality, with controls IndEP j ,t = ϑ 0 + ϑ 1 Growth j ,t + ϑ 2 Leverage j ,t + ϑ 3 Beta j ,t + ϑ 4 Size j ,t + ϑ 5 AQ j ,t + ò j ,t Pred Sign Turnover is defined as the average ratio of the daily trading volume (in shares) to number of outstanding shares (in thousand shares). All the other variables follow the previous definition.
Conclusion
Academic researchers have long recognized that any hypothesis test is a joint test of the hypothesis and the correct model specification. Testing EMH is a classic example that jointly tests EMH and the correct asset pricing model. The null of EMH could be wrongly rejected due to the incorrect model even if EMH indeed holds. The same argument can be made to earn-ings management literature that tries to detect earnings management through discretionary accruals. This paper argues that industry models are misinterpreted in the sense that they assume the commonly used industry classification scheme does a reasonable job in grouping homogeneous firms. If this key assumption does not hold, the interpretations of the residual terms are misleading. By definition, if a portion of firms in the industry is misclassified, they tend to have larger magnitude residuals simply because the industry model fits them poorly. Moreover, industry misclassification tends to be associated with certain firm characteristics, which could introduce directional bias into the model and help researchers find "some" results. Hence, alternative explanations need to be considered for implications derived from industry models.
I provide evidence showing that the commonly used industry classification is indeed noisy and biased. I revisit Francis et al. (2005) and show that their construction of AQ based on industry-specific regression is likely to suffer from the misclassification problem. I show that their documented cost-of-capital effect associated with AQ becomes much less significant, after controlling for this problem. I also provide alternative interpretations of their results, using "illiquidity discount" and "diversification discount". These explanations are consistent with the bias explanation that arises from industry misclassification. 
